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How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be 
Transferred to the President? 
LOUIS FISHER* 
NEAL DEVINS** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After attempting to reassert its fiscal prerogatives in 1974 by passing the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 1 Congress in recent 
years has passed through a period of institutional self-doubt. Less confident 
in its internal budgetary process, it appears willing to let power drift either to 
the President or outside agencies and to rely on automatic mechanisms to 
control spending and deficits. The automatic deficit reduction procedures 
contained in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985,2 commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, illustrate this 
attitude. 
That the item veto proposal commands so much attention in Congress 
provides further evidence that some members are willing to surrender addi-
tional budgetary duties. The item veto would permit the President to veto 
individual items within an appropriations bill. Although in the last century 
this proposal has been offered as a constitutional amendment numerous 
times,3 rarely has it received any serious consideration. Prior to 1984, the 
only floor action occurred in 1938 when the House of Representatives voted 
to give the President item veto authority by statute.4 The final bill, however, 
* Specialist, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. B.S. 1956, College of 
William and Mary; Ph.D. 1967, New School for Social Research. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as positions of the Congressional 
Research Service. 
** Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Assistant Professor of Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary (starting fall, 1987). B.A. 1978, 
Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. The views expressed in this article are 
those of the author and should not be interpreted as positions of the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights. 
1. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. & 31 
U.S.C.). 
2. Pub. L. No. 99-177, §§ 251-256, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-906 (Supp. 
III 1985)). 
3. One of the earliest efforts to enact an item veto occurred in 1876, when Rep. Charles Faulkner 
introduced a joint resolution so to amend the Constitution. See H.R.J. Res. 45, 44th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 4 CoNG. REc. 477 (Jan. 18, 1876). 
4. 83 CoNG. REc. 355-56 (1938). An amendment to the appropriations bill authorized the Presi-
dent to eliminate or reduce any appropriation, in whole or in part, subject to congressional disap-
proval within 60 days. 
159 
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did not contain this provision.5 In 1984 and again in 1985, Senator Mack 
Mattingly attempted to give the President item veto authority by statute. 6 
These efforts provoked extensive Senate debate and hearings, 7 but no legisla-
tion. Joint resolutions to amend the Constitution by granting item veto au-
5. Act of May 23, 1938, Pub. L. No. 534, ch. 259, 52 Stat. 410. 
6. In 1984, Sen. Mattingly introduced an amendment that would have authorized the President 
to "disapprove any item of appropriation." See 130 CoNG. REC. S5297 (daily ed. May 3, 1984). 
The bill also proposed, however, that Congress could override the President's action by a simple 
majority vote of each chamber rather than the two-thirds required by article I, § 7, of the Constitu-
tion. Id. The Senate rejected his amendment by upholding a point of order raised by Sen. Lawton 
Chiles, who argued that the amendment was legislation attempting to change the Constitution. I d. 
at S5312, S5323. See generally Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 
N.C.L. REV. 707, 719-22 (1985) (discussing Senate debate on constitutionality of Mattingly's 
amendment). 
In 1985, Sen. Mattingly proposed that the enrolling clerk be authorized to separate each "item" 
from an appropriations bill and treat each item as a separate bill or joint resolution to be submitted 
to the President for his signature or veto. S. 43, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See 131 CONG. REc. 
S135-36 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Sen. Mattingly). 
7. See 131 CONG. REc. S9600-27 (daily ed. July 17, 1985); id. at S9703-23 (daily ed. July 18, 
1985); id. at S9793-9806 (daily ed. July 19, 1985); id. at S9827-40 (daily ed. July 22, 1985); id. at 
S9872-78 (daily ed. July 23, 1985); id. at S9915-47 (daily ed. July 24, 1985). After three unsuccess-
ful efforts to end a filibuster, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole requested unanimous consent 
that the motion to proceed to Mattingly's bill be withdrawn. 131 CONG. REc. S9947 (daily ed. July 
24, 1985); see Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Adminis-
tration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Line Item Veto Hearings]. 
An item veto created by statute rather than amendment would be subject to serious constitutional 
challenge. The veto power given the President by the Constitution is limited to discrete enactments, 
not portions of a bill. Recent statutory alternatives have proposed that the enrolling clerk would 
take an appropriations bill that had cleared both houses of Congress and add to each numbered 
section or unnumbered paragraph of the bill an enacting or resolving clause, provide an appropriate 
title to these "mini" bills, and presumably affix a new bill number. See S. 43, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985); Line Item Veto Hearings, supra, at 85 (statement of Louis Fisher, Congressional Research 
Service). The possibility that Congress is empowered to craft such a procedure is clouded by the 
Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In holding the legislative veto 
unconstitutional, the Chadha Court emphasized that "the fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save 
it if it is contrary to the Constitution." Id. at 944. Chadha, if followed, demands that constitution-
ally designed processes of bicameralism and presentment oflegislation be followed by Congress and 
the President. Article I, § 7 of the Constitution provides that every bill presented "shall have 
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate." Each "mini" bill presented to the President 
under S. 43, described above, would only have passed each house in aggregate form. See generally 
Line Item Veto Hearings, supra, at 10-12, 13-20 (statement of Johnny Killian, Congresional Re-
search Service) (testimony regarding constitutional implications of Chadha decision on line item 
veto); id. at 82-85 (statement of Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service) (same). 
In addition to questioning the identification of an item as a "bill," the item veto can be challenged 
as an improper delegation oflegislative power to the President. As recognized by Johnny Killian of 
the Congressional Research Service: 
Delegation oflegislative authority is always made to the President ... in the context of the 
execution of the law .... 
The attempted delegation to the President of an item veto would not involve his execu-
tive functions; it would rather enlarge his legislative responsibilities, his power to partici-
pate in the legislative process. As such it woujld [sic] be subject to the objections •.. to a 
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thority to the President are introduced in every Congress. 8 
The Senate debates in 1984 and 1985 underscore the unusual interest in 
the item veto proposal. If the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act fails to solve 
the federal deficit problems, either because of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Bowsher v. Synar9 or because of stalemates between Congress and the 
President, the item veto will loom as a likely tool for budgetary restraint. It 
represents another seemingly mechanical alternative to making politically 
difficult choices and promises to relieve Congress of some budgetary 
responsibilities. 
The item veto requires careful consideration at this time for another rea-
son. The Reagan Administration has been making a concerted effort to ob-
tain this authority for the President, claiming it will help redress the chronic 
inability of the federal government to control spending and budget deficits. 
In support of this contention, the President has pointed to the fact that most 
governors have this authority: "I ask you to give me what 43 Governors 
have: Give me a line-item veto this year. Give me the authority to veto 
waste, and I'll take the responsibility, I'll make the cuts, I'll take the heat."10 
A. THE RISKS OF EMULATION: UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF POWER 
This article is motivated by two concerns. First, it is necessary to look 
closely at the legal, political, and administrative problems of trying to borrow 
the item veto from the states and graft it onto the federal system. Second, the 
general enlargement of those legislative powers and it would not be subject to the counter 
arguments that successful delegations of legislative power to the executive could supply. 
Id. at 18. These issues will not be explored in this article. Rather than examining whether any 
statutory item veto would be unconstitutional and consequently whether the item veto can only be 
created through a constitutional amendment, this article is concerned with the operation of the item 
veto. 
8. For example, in the first session of the 99th Congress alone, at least 10 separate constitutional 
amendments to give item veto authority to the President were introduced. See S.J. Res. 11, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S.J. Res. 162, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 15, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 18, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 49, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985); H.R.J. Res. 57, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 97, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 
H.R.J. Res. 130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R.J. Res. 139, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R.J. 
Res. 337, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
9. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). The Court struck down the provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Act that gave the Comptroller General "the ultimate authority to determine the budget cuts to 
be made." Id. at 3192 (citing Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252(a)(3), 99 Stat. 1074 (1985) (codified at 2 
U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985)). Chief Justice Burger reasoned that Congress had unconstitu-
tionally retained control over enforcement of the Act since the Comptroller General may be re-
moved by a joint resolution. Id. The Court left the remainder of the Act, with its alternative 
budget reduction mechanisms, intact, but whether the Act retains its efficacy is yet to be seen. 
10. President's State of the Union Address, 22 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 135, 136 (Feb. 4, 
1986). In his 1987 State of the Union Address, President Reagan "once again" urged Congress to 
give him "the same tool that 43 governors have-a line-item veto." President's State of the Union 
Address, reprinted in Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1987, at AS, col. 3. 
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granting of item veto authority to the President may fundamentally alter the 
constitutional balance between Congress and the President. 
The "state analogy" suffers from a number of serious deficiencies. The 
item veto exercised by the governors of many states is sustained by a govern-
mental design unique to the states and cannot be severed from it. State con-
stitutions differ dramatically from the federal Constitution, especially in their 
distribution of executive and legislative powers. There is a much greater 
state bias against legislatures than exists at the national level. State budget 
procedures differ substantially from federal procedures. Appropriations bills 
in the states are structured to facilitate item vetoes by governors. Appropria-
tions bills passed by Congress contain few items. Finally, state judges have 
experienced severe problems in developing a coherent and principled ap-
proach to monitoring the scope of item veto power. Many of those problems 
would be duplicated and possibly compounded at the federal level. 
More fundamentally, the adoption of what might appear to be a relatively 
modest reform proposal could result in a radical redistribution of constitu-
tional power. The item veto has significance beyond the budgetary savings 
that may, or may not, be realized. At stake are the power relationships be-
tween the executive and legislative branches, the exercise of Congress' his-
toric power over the purse, and the relative abilities of each branch to 
establish budgetary priorities. 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
For more than a century, Congress has considered and consistently re-
jected proposals to grant an item veto to the President. These repeated rejec-
tions have been founded on the understanding that the item veto would 
gravely undermine the fiscal responsibilities of Congress and greatly augment 
the ability of the President to impose his political agenda on the nation. 
Prior to 1921, the President had no formal budgetary responsibilities. 11 
Congress felt that granting such power to the President would improperly 
diminish legislative power. Joseph Cannon, Speaker of the House from 1903 
to 1911, warned that an executive budget would signify the surrender of the 
most important element of representative government: "I think we had bet-
ter stick pretty close to the Constitution with its division of powers well de-
fined and the taxing power close to the people."12 
The financial implications of World War !-especially the huge national 
debt that had to be managed by the Treasury Department-led to passage of 
11. See L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 9-35 (1975) (discussing presidential duties 
in budget matters prior to the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act). 
12. J. CANNON, THE NATIONAL BUDGET, H.R. Doc. No. 264, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 
(1919). 
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the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.13 The Act required the President to 
construct and submit an annual budget but allowed Congress complete free-
dom to alter the proposed budget.14 Some budget reformers wanted to pro-
hibit Congress from appropriating money altogether unless it had been 
requested by a department head or Congress could secure a two-thirds ma-
jority.15 Just as the British Parliament had yielded the initiative in financial 
legislation to the Cabinet, thus denying legislators any right to amend the 
budget submitted, so too was Congress urged to relinquish its powers to the 
President. 16 
These ideas for reform were considered inimical to the American system of 
separation of powers and the financial prerogatives accorded Congress under 
the Constitution. The Budget and Accounting Act allowed Congress to in-
crease or decrease the President's budget by simple majority vote. The Act 
respected two essential constitutional principles: the President's responsibil-
ity for his proposals and Congress' ultimate responsibility for appropriations 
subject only to the President's veto. Congressional fiscal prerogatives were 
not surrendered or diluted, nor was there any invasion of executive preroga-
tives. Neither branch was made subordinate to the other; their respective 
roles were carefully preserved. 
Congress again sought to protect its budgetary prerogative and preserve 
the balance of power between the executive and itself when it enacted the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.17 This legis-
lation was passed in response to what Congress perceived to be a loss of 
power to the President, demonstrated particularly by the refusal of the exec-
utive to spend appropriated funds during the administrations of Lyndon 
Johnson and Richard Nixon. 18 The 1974 Act contained a number ofprovi-
13. Pub. L. No. 13, Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921). 
14. L. FISHER, supra note 11, at 34. 
15. See H.R. Doc. No. 1006, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1918) (precluding congressional appropria-
tion in excess of amounts requested by executive); 2 D. HOUSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON'S 
CABINET 88 (1926) (advocating that Congress adopt rule that it make no increases in appropria-
tions reported out of committee except by two-thirds majority); SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, 
1918-1919 ANNUAL REPORT 117, 121 (1919) (Congress should not be permitted to increase Presi-
dent's budget requests); W. WILLOUGHBY, THE PROBLEM OF A NATIONAL BUDGET 146-49 (1918) 
(discussing opinion of Chairman of House Committee on Appropriations that budget power should 
be concentrated in the executive). See generally Collins, Constitutional Aspects of a National 
Budget System, 25 YALE L.J. 376 (1916) (discussing proposed national budget system that would 
give President responsibility for preparing budget); Fitzgerald, American Financial Methods from 
the Legislative Point of View, MuN. RES., June 1915, at 312, 322, 340 (recommending that Congress 
be prohibited from appropriating funds not requested in the President's budget except in extraordi-
nary circumstances). 
16. See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 
231-34 (1985) (discussing several early proposals to increase executive power over budget). 
17. Pub. L. No. 93-344, title X, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 
(1982 & Supp. Ill 1985)). 
18. L. FISHER, supra note 11, at 175-97. 
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sions designed to strengthen congressional control over fiscal affairs. Presi-
dential rescissions of appropriated funds require approval by both the Senate 
and House. 19 The President could defer the spending of funds, subject to a 
one house veto. 20 The Act also created Budget Committees in the House and 
Senate, 21 established a Congressional Budget Office to supply technical sup-
port,22 and required the adoption of budget resolutions to set overall limits 
on budget aggregates (such as total outlays and revenues) and permit debate 
on spending priorities.23 Despite these changes, the 1974 Act did not alter 
the principles established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The 
President retained responsibility for the budget he submitted, and Congress 
did not attempt to control its contents. The budget passed by Congress, 
adopted in the form of a concurrent resolution, applied only to the internal 
workings of Congress. Again, neither branch invaded the other's core 
responsibilities. 
In 1985, Congress divested itself of some budgetary control by passing the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.24 Under this Act, Congress and the Presi-
dent each prepare a budget within a maximum deficit ceiling specified by the 
statute. If presidential and congressional actions fail to abide by that ceiling, 
a sequestration report, prepared initially by the Congressional Budget Office 
and the Office of Management and Budget but put in final form by the 
Comptroller General, would implement across-the-board cuts to federal pro-
grams. 25 This mechanism was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court.26 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings represents something of a hybrid. Congress was 
no longer willing to trust its internal budgetary process, yet it also refused to 
trust the President. As a compromise, it delegated authority to the Comp-
troller General, an officer that the courts have located somewhere between 
the executive and legislative branches. 27 
The item veto is a step beyond this. It would deliberately take power from 
19. Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 1012, 1017, 88 Stat. 333-334, 337-338 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 
683, 688 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
20. Id. §§ 1013, 88 Stat. 334-335. 
21. Id. §§ 101-102, 88 Stat. 299-302. 
22. /d. §§ 201-203, 88 Stat. 302-305. 
23. /d. §§ 301, 305, 88 Stat. 306-308, 310-312. 
24. Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985);see Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress 
and the President Pass This Buck?, 64 TEX. L. REv. 131, 131 (1985) (labeling Act "whole abdica-
tion of constitutional responsibility"). 
25. Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, §§ 251-256, 99 Stat. 1063-92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-906 
(Supp. III 1985)). . 
26. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192 (1986). 
27. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 884-86 (3d Cir. 
1986) (Comptroller General exercises duties in both the executive and legislative branches); United 
States ex rel Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 234 F. Supp. 94, 99-100 (D.D.C.) (Comptroller 
General performs both legislative and executive functions), aff'd, 339 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
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Congress and place it in the hands of the President. Contrary to the consti-
tutional principles followed in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and 
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President's budget would assume 
a superior status. Members of Congress could continue to add items that the 
President did not request, but they would now need a two-thirds majority to 
override his decision to strike the items. Not only would the President exer-
cise the item veto to protect the budget he submitted, he and his assistants 
could use this power to control the votes of members of Congress on legisla-
tion, appropriations, nominations, and treaties. The dynamics of this polit-
ical process will be explored in this article. 
Differences in federal and state budgetary processes suggest that the major 
effect of a federal item veto would not be the reduction of budget deficits. 
Instead, the President would have greater power to advance his policy 
agenda at the expense of congressional priorities. For the reasons detailed 
below, we think granting item veto authority would do little to resolve the 
deficit problems, while seriously exacerbating conflicts between the executive 
and Congress and creating additional tensions between the political branches 
and the judiciary. Before considering the adoption of the item veto, the rec-
ord of the states must be carefully reviewed. In addition, state cases similar 
to those that would be litigated in the federal courts if the item veto were 
adopted must be studied. Finally, careful consideration of the potentially 
profound changes in congressional-presidential relations implicated by the 
item veto is necessary. 
Part II of this article describes the various forms that the item veto may 
take, highlighting the risks of simplistic thinking about this intricate concept. 
Part III reviews judicial approaches to the gubernatorial item veto. This re-
view demonstrates that court rulings have been instrumental in defining the 
parameters of the governors' item veto authority and that among the state 
courts there are extreme variations in interpretations of similar item veto 
provisions. Part IV assesses the operation of the item veto in the states. Be-
cause proponents of the presidential item veto often cite the states' experi-
ence, it is important to determine whether the item veto has succeeded on the 
state level. Part V extrapolates from the states' experience to predict the 
likely operation of a federal item veto. First, the applicability of the states' 
model is considered. Second, the states' experience in three matters instruc-
tive in evaluating an item veto for the President are explored: (1) Is the item 
veto a deficit reduction measure or a partisan political tool? (2) How will the 
item veto affect the balance of power between the executive and Congress? 
(3) What role will the courts play in defining the scope of the item veto 
power? In each instance, the states' experience calls into question the desira-
bility of a federal item veto. 
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II. DEFINING THE ITEM VETO 
Although the "item veto" is generally treated as a simple concept, in fact 
the states have adopted a number of variations. In its simplest form, a gover-
nor may veto individual items in appropriations bills.28 What constitutes an 
"item," however, is a source of constant reinterpretation by, and dispute 
among, governors, legislators, and courts. Some governors have been able to 
veto not merely appropriation (dollar) items but substantive provisions as 
well. 29 The latter is particularly controversial when the legislature intends 
the substantive provision to act as a condition or qualification on the appro-
priated amount. 
In several states the "simple" item veto seemed too blunt an instrument, 
and state constitutions were amended to permit the governor not only the 
power to veto an item in its entirety but the option to reduce its level. Ten 
state constitutions explicitly give the governor this power, known as the 
"item reduction veto. "30 In some states without this explicit provision, such 
as Pennsylvania, court decisions yielded an implied gubernatorial power to 
reduce dollar amounts in appropriations bills.31 This practice has provoked 
a number of court cases and will be discussed in more detail below. 
Another type of item veto is the "amendatory veto," which allows a gover-
nor to condition his approval of an enacted bill by returning it to the legisla-
ture with suggestions for change. Specifically, the governor may present 
amendments for the consideration of legislators. First adopted by Alabama 
in its Constitution of 1901,32 a constitutional provision authorizing some 
form of the amendatory veto has been adopted in seven states.33 The proce-
dure may be limited to technical and nonsubstantive corrections. In South 
Dakota, for example, the state constitution limits the scope of the amenda-
tory veto by providing that the governor may return bills "with errors in 
28. See COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (governor "shall have power to disapprove of any item or 
items of any bill making appropriations of money"). 
29. See Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 504-07, 479 A.2d 403, 414-16 (1984) (general conditions, 
limitations, or restrictions in appropriations act can be discrete subject of line item veto); Elmhurst 
Convalescent Center v. Bates, 46 Ohio App. 2d 206, 211, 348 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1975) (legislative 
restrictions on appropriation deemed item subject to veto). 
30. ALASKA CONST. art. II,§ 15; CAL. CONST. art. IV,§ 10; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 17; ILL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 9(d); MAss. CONST. art. 90, § 4 (amending art. 63, § 5); Mo. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 26; NEB. CONST. art. IV,§ 15; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 15; TENN. CONST. art. III,§ 18; \V, 
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(11). 
31. See Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161,48 A. 976 (1901) (allowing governor to approve 
$10,000,000 of an $11,000,000 appropriation). 
32. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 125; see \V. DODD, STATE GOVERNMENT 191 (1928) (stating that 
§ 125 was adopted in 1901). 
33. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 125; ILL. CoNST. art. IV, § 9(e); MASS. CONST. amend. art. 90, § 3; 
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10(2); N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, 14(b)(3); S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 4; VA. 
CONST. art. V, § 6. 
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style or form" to the legislature with specific recommendations for change. 34 
The amendatory veto, however, can also be used to make major policy 
changes. In Illinois, the belief that the process could be confined to minor 
and technical alterations was contradicted by major confrontations between 
the governor and the legislature. 35 
The precise contours of a governor's item veto authority are further com-
plicated by court rulings and gubernatorial practices. As explained in subse-
quent parts, state courts are sharply divided on whether and to what extent 
item veto authority may undercut legislative intent. There are intense de-
bates about the appropriate role of the judiciary in overseeing executive-legis-
lative conflicts, and state legislatures have been able to limit item veto 
authority through adroit legislative drafting. Consequently, similar statutory 
or constitutional language often translates into quite different item veto au-
thority. Furthermore, the frequency of use of this authority is unpredictable. 
Depending on executive custom, use of this power may prove commonplace 
or rare. 
It appears likely that President Reagan would take a broad and activist 
view of any item veto authority. An Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) study characterized item reduction authority as "vital," recom-
mending that "great care must be taken to ensure that any federal proposal 
clearly grants this desirable power to the President."36 The OMB study also 
urged that "any federal proposal should expressly grant" authority to the 
President to veto substantive provisions ("riders") attached to an appropria-
tions bi11.37 Moreover, studies of Governor Reagan's record in California 
indicate that he actively used item veto authority.38 Other administrations 
34. S.D. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4. 
35. See generally Sevener, The Amendatory Veto: To Be or Not to Be So Powerful?, 11 ILL. IssuES 
14 (1985) ("because one governor has not understood basic separation of powers and has vastly 
abused his power ... [this has] led to the ill repute of [the item veto] and led to friction between the 
two branches") (quoting original sponsor ofitem veto legislation); Comment, The Illinois Amenda-
tory Veto, 11 JoHN MARSHALL J. PRAc. & PRoc. 415 (1978) (discussing broad power of Illinois 
governor to use amendatory veto). 
36. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EcONOMIC POLICY STUDY No. 12, at 59 (1983). 
37. Id. Congress sometimes resorts to the adoption of legislative riders on controversial meas-
ures that languish in authorization committees. See generally Devins, The Regulation of Govern-
ment Agencies Through Appropriations Riders (forthcoming in Duke Law Journal). 
38. See H. Griffin, The Politics of the Budgetary Process in California, 1965-1971, at 255-68 
(1976) (Ph.D. dissertation, U.C.L.A.) (analyzing Gov. Reagan's aggressive use, and threats of use, 
of item veto) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). For the actual veto amounts as well as the 
percentages vetoed by Gov. Reagan from 1967 to 1975, see CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FIN., ITEM 
VETOES DURING GOVERNOR REAGAN'S TERM (1984) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). 
Also pertinent to the issue of the line item veto is City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. 
Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). President Reagan had used au-
thority given him under the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to defer funds for 
certain federal programs. By delaying the budget authority, he had severely restricted those pro-
grams. Congress could not use the one house veto provided in the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 684(b) (1982), to 
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might rely more or less heavily on such authority, and courts will inevitably 
shape the contours of permissible executive item veto authority. In sum, the 
item veto is not capable of simple assessment. 
III. THE ITEM VETO AND THE COURTS 
State court decisions concerning the item veto are important for several 
reasons. First, they highlight the confusion over the reach of this power. 
Second, they demonstrate that the item veto may prove to be a potent polit-
ical tool. Third, these cases suggest that if the President is given item veto 
authority, the dimensions of this new power may well be decided in the 
courts. 
A. THE DIMENSIONS OF ITEM VETO AUTHORITY 
The first substantive issue addressed in these cases is purely definitional: 
what is the reach of the governor's item veto authority? In many cases, the 
courts must look beyond the constitutional language and either broaden or 
narrow the specified item veto authority. 
For example, in interpreting a constitutional provision that appropriation 
bills "may be approved in whole or in part by the governor,"39 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court approved the governor's deletion of language in an appropri-
ations bill in a way that substantially changed the bill's effect.40 The gover-
nor had altered the financing of the state Election Commission Fund so that 
state money, rather than individual taxpayer contributions, would under-
write this fund. The court, applying a broad interpretation of this provision, 
concluded that "because the Governor's power to veto is coextensive with 
the legislature's power to enact laws initially, a governor's partial veto may, 
and usually will, change the policy of the law."41 In the court's view, an item 
veto may be used "so long as the net result of the partial veto is a complete, 
entire, and workable bill which the legislature itself could have passed in the 
first instance. "42 
override the President because the Supreme Court had declared the legislative veto unconstitu-
tional. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional similar one house veto 
provision oflmmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982)). The District Court in 
New Haven said the authority used by the President amounted to a line item veto. 634 F. Supp. at 
1458. The court held that the President's deferral authority was inseverable from the invalid legis-
lative veto; Congress did not intend to grant the President the equivalent ofline item veto authority. 
Id. This ruling was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit and casts doubts on the legality of similar Reagan 
deferrals, totaling close to $23 billion and involving more than 40 programs. See Lewis, Reagan 
Spending Deferrals are Ruled Unconstitutional, Wash. Post, May 17, 1986, at A-1, col. 2. 
39. WIS. CONST. art. 5, § 10. 
40. State ex rei. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 708-09, 264 N.W.2d 539, 552 (1978). 
41. Id. at 708, 264 N.W.2d at 552. 
42. Id. at 715, 264 N.W.2d at 555 (emphasis added). 
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A more restrictive approach to the manner in which an item veto may 
disrupt legislative purpose was followed by the New Mexico Supreme 
Court.43 In interpreting a constitutional provision granting the governor au-
thority to veto "any part or parts, item or items, of any bill appropriating 
money,"44 the court stated: 
The Governor may not distort, frustrate or defeat the legislative purpose by 
a veto of proper legislative conditions, restrictions, limitations or contin-
gencies placed upon an appropriation and permit the appropriation to 
stand. He would thereby create new law, and this power is vested in the 
Legislature and not in the Govemor.45 
The New Mexico court's ruling against the use of the partial veto to alter 
legislative policy sharply conflicts with that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
which recognized the governor's authority to "change the policy of the law" 
through a similar partial veto provision. 
Finally, it is important to note that court interpretations of the same item 
veto provision may change over time. In 1936, a Massachusetts court held 
that the governor had improperly vetoed a condition on an appropriation. 
Words or phrases, the court said, were not "items or parts of items."46 By 
1981, the Massachusetts court abandoned this ruling and allowed the gover-
nor to delete restrictive words and phrases accompanying an appropriation 
item, provided that the language was separable from the appropriation.47 
The cases above demonstrate two simple but quite significant propositions. 
First, the reach of an item veto provision is neither uniform nor static. As 
shown above, similar item veto provisions in New Mexico and Wisconsin 
have quite distinct meanings. Second, the courts are significant actors in 
shaping the meaning of item veto provisions. It is, therefore, important to 
determine whether and to what extent courts are capable of developing a 
coherent doctrinal approach to the item veto. In terms of defining the scope 
of item vetoes, the judicial record appears quite mixed. 
B. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
The central issue raised in item veto cases is the degree to which authority 
can be granted to the governor without infringing on the responsibilities of 
the legislature. This matter often arises when a governor vetoes conditions in 
an appropriation while retaining the funds. State judges must then resolve 
such issues as whether the governor can convert a conditional appropriation 
into an unconditional appropriation; that is, whether he can strike legislative 
43. State ex rei. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974). 
44. N.M. CoNsr. art. IV, § 22. 
45. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. at 366, 524 P.2d at 982. 
46. Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 616, 619-20, 2 N.E.2d 789, 790 (1936). 
47. Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 828, 832-38, 428 N.E.2d 117, 120-23 (1981). 
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language from a dollar amount or must treat the two as a single item to be 
accepted or vetoed in whole. These issues have bedeviled state courts for 
nearly a century, and no "bright lines" yet define the governors' powers. 
Reviewing courts generally adopt one of two rationales. If the court disap-
proves of the item veto or the manner in which it has been wielded, it empha-
sizes the need to safeguard the legislative prerogative. If it approves, the 
court holds that the item veto is part of the government structure and must 
be preserved. The New Mexico and Wisconsin state court rulings reflect 
these competing approaches. While the New Mexico court stressed the sanc-
tity of the legislative process,48 the Wisconsin court pointed to the governor's 
coequal power.49 Other state court decisions reflect this basic and enduring 
division. 
Illustrative of court decisions that protect legislative prerogatives is an 
1898 Mississippi case. 5° In prohibiting the governor from vetoing objection-
able conditions on appropriations, the court explained that appropriations 
bills had three essential parts: the purpose of the bill, the sum appropriated 
for the purpose, and the conditions upon which the appropriation would be-
come available. 51 Allowing the governor to strike the conditions would pro-
duce a law that had never received the legislature's assent: 
[T]he executive, in every republican form of government, has only a quali-
fied and destructive legislative function, and never creative legislative 
power. If the governor may select, dissect, and dissever, where is the limit 
of his right? Must it be a sentence or a clause or a word? Must it be a 
section, or any part of a section, that may meet with executive disapproba-
tion? May the governor transform a conditional or a contingent appropria-
tion into an absolute one, in disregard and defiance of the legislative will? 
That would be the enactment of law by executive authority without the 
concurrence of the legislative will and in the face of it. 52 
Similar themes surfaced repeatedly in later cases: the legislature may place 
conditions on appropriations; the veto is destructive and not creative; the 
governor may not use the item veto to dissect a bill and distort the legislative 
will. As subsequent parts will reveal, states courts discovered that it was not 
an easy matter to distinguish appropriate conditions from inappropriate, to 
separate the act of destruction from creation, or to determine (much less 
preserve) the legislative will. 
Like the Mississippi court, many state courts have invoked these themes to 
preserve legislative prerogatives. An item veto by the governor of Washing-
48. See Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. at 366, 524 P.2d at 982. 
49. See State ex ref. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 707-09, 264 N.W.2d 539, 551-52 (1978). 
50. State v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158, 23 So. 643 (1898). 
51. Id. at 181, 23 So. at 645. 
52. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 75 Geo. L. J. 171 1986-1987
1986] ITEM VETO 171 
ton in 1909 raised the perennial question of how the veto can be exercised on 
a portion of a bill without disrupting the internal consistency and logic of the 
sections that are preserved. 53 The governor had vetoed the first four sections 
of a bill while approving the last two, one of which repealed an earlier stat-
ute. As originally passed by the legislature, the repealing section was con-
nected in substance and logic to the first four sections. The court held that 
when the first four sections fell because of the item veto, so did the repealing 
section: "In other words, when the executive approved the repealing section 
he approved something that his veto had already destroyed."54 The repeal-
ing section was, therefore, a nullity. 
Some governors have displayed ingenuity in using item veto power. One 
governor, for example, struck the words "per annum" from the item "$2500 
per annum."55 The effect was to reduce a two-year amount from $5000 to 
$2500. He also reduced "$4500 per annum" to "$3500 per annum."56 The 
reviewing court held that the governor could not disapprove part of an 
item. 57 He had to disapprove the item entirely because item reduction with-
out the express authority of the constitution "would be a clear encroachment 
by the executive upon the rights of the legislative department of the state."58 
In a similar case, another governor attempted unsuccessfully to exercise his 
item veto authority by striking the numeral "2" from a $25 million bond 
authorization. 59 
In some cases, however, courts have drawn the line in favor of executive 
power. These cases often arose when a legislature tried to circumvent the 
governor's item veto power. In one case, for example, the California legisla-
ture sought to undercut the governor by inserting in an appropriations bill a 
proviso that empowered the state controller, at the request of the state direc-
tor of education, to transfer appropriations from one program to another.60 
The proviso had the effect of placing the power to determine the amount 
appropriated to an item in the hands of the governor's subordinate. The 
53. See Spokane Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 109 P. 316 (1910). 
54. Id. at 86, 109 P. at 320. 
55. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 347, 110 N.E. 130, 147 (1915). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 348, 110 N.E. at 147. 
58. Id; see Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 403-04, 218 P. 139, 
146-47 (1923) (unconstitutional excess of veto power to object to part of bill not an item); Fairfield 
v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 153-54, 156, 214 P. 319, 322-23, 325 (1923) (unconstitutional to veto condi-
tion of appropriation while allowing appropriation itself to stand; constitutes affirmative legislation 
without concurrence of legislature); Callaghan v. Boyce, 17 Ariz. 433, 456-58, 153 P. 773, 782-83 
(1915) (unconstitutional to permit veto of separate section of general appropriation); Miller v. Wal-
ley, 122 Miss. 521, 536, 84 So. 466, 468 (1920) (unconstitutional to veto condition of appropriation 
while approving appropriation). 
59. State ex rei. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 720, 264 N.W.2d 539, 557 (1978) (Hansen, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
60. Wood v. Riley, 192 Cal. 293, 296, 219 P. 966, 968 (1923). 
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court sustained the governor's item veto of this provision, stating that the 
proviso would "by indirection, defeat the purpose of the constitutional 
amendment giving the Governor power to control the expenditures of the 
state, when it could not accomplish that purpose directly or by an express 
provision in appropriations bills."6 I 
Many courts have developed tests to separate valid item vetoes from inva-
lid ones. Some courts have held that a governor may sever sections from a 
bill if such action is merely "negative" in effect. 62 However, the same actions 
have also been labeled as "affirmative" on the ground that they create "a 
result different from that intended, and arrived at, by the legislature."63 In 
1940, a Virginia court invoked an intriguing medical analogy to distinguish 
between severable and inseverable items. 64 It defined an "item" as something 
that could be taken out of a bill without affecting its other purposes or provi-
sions: "It is something which can be lifted bodily from it rather than cut out. 
No damage can be done to the surrounding legislative tissue, nor should any 
scar tissue result therefrom."65 The court announced that if a provision or 
condition is "intimately interlocked" with other portions of the bill, the veto 
is unauthorized. 66 Such tests, however, have proved too abstract to apply. 67 
State courts also differ in rulings governing the structure of appropriations 
bills. Some state constitutions and statutes include specifications for the style 
and format of appropriations bills. 68 To prevent the erosion of the gover-
nor's item veto authority, some state courts have given additional guidance 
to state legislatures regarding the manner in which they may draft appropria-
61. Id. at 305, 219 P. at 971; see People v. Tremaine, 252 N.Y. 27, 42-43, 168 N.E. 817, 821-22 
(1929) (legislative condition may not undercut item veto by granting administrative powers to 
legislators). 
62. See, e.g., Fairfield v. Foster, 29 Ariz. 146, 156, 214 P. 319, 323 (1923) (describing veto power 
as purely negative in nature); Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Wash. 616, 620, 30 P.2d 
976, 978 (1934) (upholding veto with "purely negative" effect). 
63. Cascade Tel. Co., 176 Wash. at 623, 30 P.2d at 979 (Steinert, J., dissenting); see Washington 
Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns v. Evans, 88 Wash. 2d 563, 566, 564 P.2d 788, 791 (1977) ("governor 
may not use the veto power to reach a new or different result from what the legislature intended"). 
64. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940). 
65. Id. at 290, 11 S.E.2d at 124. 
66. Id. at 302, 11 S.E.2d at 130. But see Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 
215 La. 703, 715, 41 So. 2d 509, 512 (1949) (veto of several appropriation items did not nullify 
remainder of section); Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wash. 2d 498, 509-10, 104 P.2d 478, 483 (1940) 
(veto of one section of act did not render unenforceable remainder of wage provision); State ex ref. 
Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 408, 25 P.2d 91, 93-94 (1933) (veto of parts of an act leaves remain· 
der as only bill to be considered). 
67. See Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 536, 546, 682 P.2d 869, 874 
(1984) (affirmative-negative test "unworkable and subjective"); see also State ex ref. Kleczka v. 
Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 721, 264 N.W.2d 539, 557 (1978) (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (affirmative-negative distinction is "disingenuous"). 
68. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 45; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 29; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 57. 
HeinOnline -- 75 Geo. L. J. 173 1986-1987
1986] ITEM VETO 173 
tions bills.69 Other courts have accepted the legislature's prerogative to 
structure appropriations bills in any fashion it desires, even if the consolida-
tion of numerous items into a single aggregate undercuts the governor's item 
veto authority. 70 In most cases, however, the judiciary has intervened to pre-
vent the legislature from blunting or nullifying the executive's power to veto 
items.71 
The sharp conflicts among the reviewing courts are not surprising. These 
cases ask judges to draw the line between executive and legislative power. 
Subjective judgments are necessarily involved when courts determine 
whether some provision is essential to the legislative will, or whether the 
separation of powers is respected through a literal or revisionist interpreta-
tion of specified item veto authority. Because of the subjective nature of such 
judgments, it is unlikely courts will develop a coherent doctrinal approach to 
the issue. For the same reason, courts will probably continue to play a signif-
icant role in defining item veto authority. Nevertheless, some state judges in 
recent years have become increasingly skeptical about their ability to dis-
criminate between negative and affirmative vetoes. They fear that such tests 
involve the courts in "disingenuous semantic games" and are unworkable in 
practice no matter how appealing in theory.72 
69. Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 911, 913-15, 370 N.E.2d 1350, 1351-52 (1977) (when 
separate sections of bill constitute one item governor may veto only entire item not individual sec-
tions); Helena v. Omholt, 155 Mont. 212, 221-22, 468 P.2d 764, 769 (1970) (suggesting means by 
which legislature could circumvent item veto); City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 145-46, 411 
A.2d 462, 468 (1980) (constitutional provision permitting only one approrpriation law per fiscal 
year renders multiple appropriations invalid). 
70. See, e.g., Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10, 14 (Fla. 1960) (legislature may determine specificity 
of items though they may be no broader than single subject of appropriation); Regents of the State 
University v. Trapp, 28 Okla. 83, 92-93, 113 P. 910, 913-14 (1911) (special appropriation bill for 
State University one item and governor may not veto parts of bill); Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499, 
529, 140 S.W. 405, 421 (1911) (within power of legislature to group many items of appropriation 
into single item, even if deliberately done to deny partial veto). 
71. See, e.g., Fairfield v. Foster, 25 Ariz. 146, 156-57, 214 P. 319, 323 (1923) (vetoed single item 
despite "lumping" of items by legislature); Wood v. Riley, 192 Cal. 293, 305, 219 P. 966, 971 (1923) 
(proviso on budget bill treated as item subject to veto); People v. Brady, 277 Ill. 124, 131, 115 N.E. 
204, 207 (1917) (item veto of specific portions of bill valid though bill appropriated only lump sum 
without allocating amounts to each item); Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 840, 846-47, 429 
N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (1981) (act requiring approval by both houses of legislature of executive agency 
action that would alter public benefits program held unconstitutional); Opinion of the Justices, 373 
Mass. 911, 914, 370 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (1977) (veto oflanguage restricting use of previously appro-
priated funds is proper to disable legislature from circumventing item veto); Helena v. Omholt, 155 
Mont. 212, 221, 468 P.2d 764, 769 (1970) (legislative act invalidated as device to blunt veto power); 
People v. Tremaine, 281 N.Y. 1, 7, 21 N.E.2d 891, 893-94 (1939) (lump sum appropriations con-
trary to constitution's intent for itemized appropriations); State ex ref. Public Util. Comm'n v. 
Controlling Bd., 130 Ohio St. 127, 131-32, 197 N.E. 129, 131 (1935) (dictum) (legislature powerless 
to confer on administrative board authority thwarting veto power). 
72. State ex ref. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 721, 264 N.W.2d 539, 557 (1978) (Hansen, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 100 
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C. THE PROBLEM OF NONAPPROPRIA TIONS 
In determining the reach of item veto authority, state courts have had to 
determine whether spending, direct or indirect, can be done outside the regu-
lar appropriations process. An Arizona court, for example, ruled that be-
cause the governor's item veto authority was restricted to appropriations 
items he could not disapprove a gasoline tax.73 Similarly, a Wisconsin court 
ruled that the governor could not exercise his item veto on a revenue bill that 
contained a revolving fund, even if it impaired his item veto authority.74 The 
court treated taxation and appropriation as "more nearly antonyms than 
synonyms."75 This kind of reasoning encourages lawmakers to dilute item 
veto authority by financing programs indirectly through the revenue system 
rather than through a direct appropriation. 
A 1975 Montana case76 illustrates the variety of state funding practices. 
The court noted that its previous rulings had limited the scope of "appropria-
tion" to the general fund covering the basic operating costs of the state. 77 As 
a result of statutory changes, as well as amendments to the Montana consti-
tution, the court found it necessary to reexamine the definition of appropria-
tion. 78 The court extended the term to cover the general fund, the 
earmarked revenue fund, and most of the federal and private revenue 
funds. 79 Excluded from this new definition of appropriation were six types of 
funds: the sinking fund; the federal and private grant clearance fund; the 
bond proceeds and insurance clearance fund; the revolving fund; the trust 
and legacy fund; and the agency fund. 80 
In defining the scope of item veto authority, state courts have had to delve 
into a multitude of highly complex budgetary practices. An Alaska court, 
for example, held that the governor's exercise of the item veto to disapprove 
a general obligation bond authorization was unconstitutional because a bond 
Wash. 2d 536, 546, 682 P.2d 869, 874 (1984) (affirmative-negative test "unworkable and 
subjective"). 
73. Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 25 Ariz. 381, 397-98, 218 P. 139, 144-45 
(1923). 
74. State ex ref. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143, 149, 264 N.W. 622, 624 (1936). 
75. Id. at 148, 264 N.W. at 624. For other opinions limiting the governor's power to vetoing 
items only in appropriate bills, see Patterson v. Dempsey, 152 Conn. 431, 439-40, 207 A.2d 739, 745 
(1965) (power of partial veto applicable only to "bill making appropriations of money embracing 
many items"); Opinion of the Justices, 58 Del. 475, 478, 210 A.2d 852, 854 (1965) (partial veto 
applicable only to "bills appropriating money"); Opinion of the Justices, 349 Mass. 804, 810, 212 
N.E.2d 562, 567 (1965) (partial veto applicable only to bills that authorize payment of state funds 
from state treasury). 
76. Board of Regents v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975). 
77. Id. at 445, 543 P.2d at 1330. 
78. Id. at 445-46, 543 P.2d at 1330-31. 
79. Id. at 445, 543 P.2d at 1330 (citing 1947 version of Montana code section 79-415). 
80. Id. at 445, 543 P.2d at 1330-31 (interpreting 1947 version of Montana code§§ 79-410 & 79-
415). 
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authorization was not an "appropriation."81 A dissenting judge remarked 
that examination of the debate at the constitutional convention of the item 
veto "sheds little light on the subject,"82 and that it was "apparent that the 
delegates never foresaw the problems" involved in defining "appropriation," 
nor did they understand the interactions between the debt financing provi-
sion and the governor's veto. 83 
In one New Jersey case,84 several municipalities and counties complained 
that the governor's vetoes in the general appropriations bill deprived them of 
state revenue disbursements authorized by previous statutes. 85 The court up-
held the governor's right to item veto nonappropriations, noting that the pur-
pose of a general appropriations bill was to remedy the piecemeal system of 
state financing that had given counties automatic access to dedicated reve-
nues. 86 The court also examined statutes that either allocated use of state 
funds for county highways or disbursed revenues from such sources as the 
sales and use tax, the transfer inheritance tax, and the bus franchise replace-
ment tax. Such statutes, the court ruled, "do not constitute legislative appro-
priations in and of themselves."87 Three years later, a lower appellate court 
in New Jersey ruled that the governor's line-item veto power extended to a 
bill dealing with the distribution of franchise and gross receipts taxes. 88 The 
appellants had claimed that the apportionment formula for these receipts did 
not constitute an item of appropriation.89 A year later the New Jersey 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that item vetoes could 
be used to reduce the amount of state aid to the municipalities from the 
utilities franchise and gross receipts taxes. 9o 
81. Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793, 795-96 (Alaska 1977). 
82. Id. at 797 (Boochever, C.J., dissenting). 
83. /d. 
84. City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 411 A.2d 462 (1980). 
85. Id. at 141-42, 411 A.2d at 466. 
86. /d. at 146-47, 411 A.2d at 468-69. 
87. Id. at 146, 411 A.2d at 468. 
88. In re Karcher, 190 N.J. Super. 197, 220-21, 462 A.2d 1273, 1285-86 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub. nom Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 479 A.2d 403 (1984). 
89. 190 N.J. Super. at 218-20, 462 A.2d at 1284-85. 
90. Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 495, 479 A.2d 403, 409 (1984). For other complexities of state 
funding practices and their impact on the item veto, see Caldwell v. Meskill, 164 Conn. 299, 308, 
320 A.2d 788, 792 (1973) (language imposing restrictions on expenditure of money not subject to 
veto power as appropriation); People ex rei. I.F.T. v. Lindberg, 60 Ill. 2d 266, 270-72, 326 N.E.2d 
749, 751-52 (constitutional provision that membership in state pension system is enforceable con-
tractual relationship did not preclude governor from reducing appropriations made to pension 
funds), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 840, 846-47, 429 
N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (1981) (act requiring approval of both houses before alteration of public benefits 
program "immunizes" legislative action from veto); Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 911, 914, 
370 N.E.2d 1350, 1352 (1977) (amendment placing restrictions on prior appropriations subject to 
veto; otherwise legislature could evade item veto by two step process); Helena v. Omholt, 155 Mont. 
212, 221, 468 P.2d 764, 769 (1970) (legislative restrictions on appropriated funds "can blunt" veto 
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These cases raise highly technical budgetary process questions, but federal 
courts will have to apply this degree of analysis and involvement if the item 
veto is transferred to the federal level. In light of the state courts' inability to 
develop uniform objective criteria, such judicial involvement is cause for 
concern. 
D. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR THE JUDICIARY 
State courts, without question, have played a central role in determining 
the contours of a governor's item veto authority. They have not been un-
abashed activists, however. Instead, the courts have frequently found them-
selves acting as referees of highly political and technical battles between the 
governor and the legislature. 
On several occasions, individual judges and courts have openly asserted 
that this judicial role is problematic. One judge, upset with the standards 
used in his state, complained about the elusive tests employed by state judges: 
To hold that the exercise of the partial veto power may not have an "af· 
firmative," "positive" or "creative" effect on legislation, or that the veto 
may not change the "meaning" or "policy" of a bill, as some courts else· 
where have done, would be to involve this court in disingenuous semantic 
games. While these tests may be appealing in the abstract, they are un· 
workable in practice .... These tests are inescapably subjective. Without an 
objective point of reference, this court would be reduced to deciding cases 
upon its subjective assessment of the respective policies espoused by the 
legislature and the executive, an unseemly result which would foster uncer· 
tainty in the legislative process. More importantly, such a result would 
defeat its own purpose; the judicial department may no more assume the 
proper functions of the legislature, or interfere with their discharge, than 
may the govemor.91 
The Florida Supreme Court similarly voiced its exasperation with having 
to adjudicate disputes over item vetoes. In 1960, it held that the governor 
may veto an item within an item, allowing him to delete legislative restric-
power); State ex ref. Akron Educ. Ass'n v. Essex, 47 Ohio St. 2d 47, 50·51, 351 N.E.2d 118, 120 
(1976) (veto void because vetoed bill not specific appropriation of money); State ex ref. Brown v. 
Ferguson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 245, 251-52, 291 N.E.2d 434, 438 (1972) (partial veto valid despite Jump· 
ing of appropriations); Jessen Assocs. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 1975) (rider to general 
appropriations act not item which could be separately vetoed); State ex ref. Brotherton v. Blanken-
ship, 157 W. Va. 100, 112, 207 S.E.2d 421, 428 (1973) (no veto power over legislative budget as it 
relates to judiciary); State ex ref. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 130, 237 N.W.2d 910, 916 
(1976) (partial veto applicable whether item of approriation or not if vetoed portion severable and 
remainder workable). 
91. State ex ref. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 721, 264 N.W.2d 539, 557-58 (1978) (Hansen, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This dissenting opinion was later cited with approval 
by the Washington Supreme Court. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 
536, 546-47, 682 P.2d 869, 875 (1984). 
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tions on the use of appropriated funds.92 Florida amended its constitution in 
1968 to overturn the decision, prohibiting the governor from vetoing any 
qualification or restriction without also vetoing the appropriation item re-
lated to it.93 The need for subsequent judicial interpretation of the terms 
"qualification" and "restriction" ensured continued controversies between 
Florida's judiciary and the political branches. In a 1980 decision,94 the same 
court struggled to determine which "qualifications" were subject to the item 
veto and closed its opinion with the admonition that "it would be a serious 
mistake to interpret our acceptance of jurisdiction in this cause as a general 
willingness to thrust the Court into the political arena and referee on a bien-
nial basis the assertions of power of the executive and legislative branches in 
relation to the appropriations act."95 
Despite these complaints, court involvement in this matter has increased 
substantially in recent years. The period 1970 to 1984 saw an extraordinary 
upsurge in the number of cases on the item veto. Over these fifteen years 
92. Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10, 16 (Fla. 1960). 
93. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a). 
94. Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980). 
95. I d. at 671. For other cases during this period dealing with conditions on appropriations bills, 
see Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 720, 723 (Del. 1973) (partial veto applicable only to item of 
appropriation); Division of Bond Fin. v. Smathers, 337 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1976) (governor may 
not qualify action or restriction on appropriation without vetoing appropriation); In re Opinion to 
the Governor, 239 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1970) (appropriations may be made contingent on matters 
related to appropriation but not upon unrelated matter); Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 99 Idaho 404, 413, 
582 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1978) (governor may disapprove only money items of appropriation; item 
different from condition that must be observed); Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1975) 
(if governor vetoes qualification upon appropriation, must veto appropriation also); State ex rel 
Turner v. Iowa Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 1971) (provision vetoed not condi-
tion or qualification but item subject to veto); Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 157-58 (La. 1977) 
(while vetoed provision was couched in language of condition, it was not directed to expenditure of 
funds and was subject to veto); Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 828, 832, 428 N.E.2d 117, 120 
(1981) (provisions in appropriation bill did not constitute restrictions or conditions; thus provisions 
subject to veto); Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 820, 826, 429 N.E.2d 750, 754 (1981) (to main-
tain constitutional balance, partial veto extends to any separable provisions in general appropria-
tions bill); Attorney Gen. v. Administrative Justice, 384 Mass. 511,515,427 N.E.2d 735,737 (1981) 
(governor may not veto restriction or condition on item of appropriation without also vetoing entire 
item); State ex rei. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Mo. 1973) (governor powerless to strike 
merely "purpose" language from appropriation); Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 504-07, 479 A.2d 
403, 414-16 (1984) (general conditions, limitations, or restrictions in appropriations act can be dis-
crete subject of line item veto); State ex rel Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 P.2d 975, 
980 (1974) (legislature may not abridge veto with conditions or limitations on appropriations); State 
ex rei. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 271 (N.D. 1979) (governor may not veto conditions or 
restrictions on appropriations without vetoing appropriation itself); Elmhurst Convalescent Center 
v. Bates, 46 Ohio App. 2d 206, 21 I, 348 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1975) (legislative restrictions on appropri-
ation deemed item subject to veto); Brault v. Holleman, 217 Va. 441, 447, 230 S.E.2d 238, 242 
(1976) (governor cannot veto appropriation without vetoing conditions and cannot veto condition 
without vetoing appropriation); State ex rei. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 214 S.E.2d 467, 484 (W. 
Va. I 975) (governor may delete language of conditions from item but may not retain appropriated 
amount without classification of purpose). 
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there were about fifty decisions, compared to about sixty-three for the entire 
previous seventy-seven years. 96 
IV. THE ITEM VETO AND THE STATES 
A. THE RATIONALE FOR AN ITEM VETO 
Three factors contributed to the proliferation of the gubernatorial item 
veto: the states' antilegislative bias; balanced budget requirements in forty-
nine states;97 and state budget cycles. 
The most significant consideration is the fear of legislative excesses, mani-
fested in the belief that state budgetary decisions ultimately should be made 
by an executive officer. Fear of irresponsible legislative actions fueled the 
initial push for the item veto in the late nineteenth century. According to one 
observer, state legislatures during this period "were perceived . . . as being 
corrupt, open to bribes for introducing private and special legislation," while 
governors were considered "less venal than legislators. Thus, being the lesser 
of evils, trust ought to be given to governors to act as guardians of the public 
purse against avaricious legislators .... "98 
In general, the governor's power over the budget grew from 1900 to 1970 
due to the popular perception that the executive branch was a more capable 
manager than the legislature. This view was rooted in the belief that the gov-
ernment should operate as a business with the governor as chief administra-
tor.99 Gubernatorial power was further enhanced during the Depression era, 
in an effort to eliminate nonessential spending.100 Until Vietnam and Water-
gate shook the nation's confidence in the President, trust in executive respon-
sibility remained strong. By the time legislatures reasserted themselves at the 
state and national levels, the item veto was an established gubernatorial 
power. 
Constitutional constraints on legislative action were closely tied to, and in 
part responsible for, the growth of the item veto. Limitations were placed on 
96. Chronological list of appellate court cases on item veto and appendix of annotated citations 
of cases on item veto (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). 
97. Vermont is the only state that has not amended its constitution to require a balanced budget. 
26 COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1986-87, at 246 (1986) (table indicating 
requirements of budget procedures of states) [hereinafter 1986-1987 BooK OF STATES]. Similarly, 
no such requirement appears in the federal Constitution. 
98. R. Moe, Prospects for the Item Veto at the Federal Level: Lessons from the States II (Aug. 
29-31, 1985) (paper prepared for American Political Science Association 1985 Annual Meeting). 
99. See F. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 5-8 (1911) (urging applica-
tion of systematic management techniques to promote national efficiency); D. WALDO, THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE STATE 49-59 (1948) (advocating American business practices be accepted for 
governmental administration). 
100. See generally Prescott, The Executive Veto in Southern States, 10 J. PoL. 673 (1948) (analyz-
ing extreme measures utilized for fiscal stability during Depression; tracking movement toward 
adopting executive budget). 
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state borrowing.101 Prohibitions also barred a host of private, special, and 
local laws. 102 State constitutions included detailed prohibitions on the enact-
ment of private or local laws that attempted to fix the rate of interest, 103 
remit fines, penalties, or forfeitures, 104 exempt property from taxation, 105 
provide for the management of public schools, 106 alter the salaries of public 
officers during their term in office, 107 and impose other restrictions that 
would be totally inappropriate for the federal Constitution.108 These con-
straints, by impeding the legislature's authority to pass laws and appropriate 
funds, further enhanced the governors' power over the budget. 
The item veto is also based, in part, on the requirement in nearly all states 
for a balanced budget. Some governors justify item vetoes as a technique for 
remaining within the confines of a balanced budget, as required by either the 
state constitution or law. For example, Governor Dick Thornburgh of Penn-
sylvania explained his opposition to a general appropriations bill: "Since the 
Constitution requires that I enact a balanced budget, I am required by law to 
reduce the expenditures contained in this bil1."109 As a New Jersey court 
recently noted, the item veto "serves the governmental need to have a bal-
anced budget in place at the start of the fiscal year."110 
Some states judges are reluctant to be drawn into a dispute about the legiti-
macy of executive actions needed to balance a budget. Said a New York 
court in 1977: 
Assuming it were feasible to convert a courtroom into a super-auditing 
office to receive and criticize the budget estimates of a State with an $11 
billion budget, the idea is not only a practical monstrosity but would dupli-
cate exactly what the Legislature and the Governor do together, in har-
mony or in conflict, most often in conflict, for several months of each 
101. J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS 179-80, 194-98 (rev. ed. 
1969). 
102. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 19; KY. CONST. § 59; Mo. 
CoNST. art. III, § 40; N.D. CoNST. art. IV, § 43; OKLA. CoNST. art. V, § 46. 
103. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104, para. 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 19, para. 10; KY. 
CONST. §59, para. 21; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 90(d). 
104. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 104, para. 28; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 19, para. 14; Mo. 
CoNST. art. Ill, § 40, para. 7; N.D. CONST. art. Ill,§ 43, para. 17. 
105. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV,§ 104, para. 25; MISS. CONST. art. XII,§ 90(h); PA. CONST. art. 
Ill, § 32, para. 6; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14, para. 7. 
106. E.g., KY. CONST. § 59, para. 25; MISS. CONST. art. XII, § 90(p); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23, 
para. 10; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 28, para. 15. 
107. E.g., N.Y. CoNST. art. Ill,§ 17, para. 10; VA. CoNST. art. IV,§ 14, para. 14. 
108. To combat "logrolling" by the legislature, for example, state constitutions often limited the 
number of subjects that could be included in a bill. In Florida the constitution was amended in 
1868 to require that each law "enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter 
properly connected therewith." Green v. Rawls, 122 So. 2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1960). 
109. D. Thornburgh, Governor's Message to the Senate of Pennsylvania 1 (July 11, 1983) (tran-
script on file at Georgetown Law Journal). 
110. Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 507, 479 A.2d 403, 416 (1984). 
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year. ttl 
The third justification for the governor's item veto is the longer budget 
cycle that operates in the states. 112 When state legislatures meet only once 
every other year or adopt a biennial budget, it is necessary to delegate to the 
governor substantial authority over the two-year period, including the flexi-
bility to veto items and impound funds. Moreover, some state legislatures 
that meet annually still adopt a biennial budget. 113 The federal government, 
of course, continues to pass appropriations bills annually. 
B. OTHER ATTRIBUTES CONDUCIVE TO AN ITEM VETO 
Two other features of most state governments are especially conducive to 
the item veto. First, state constitutions generally contain specific controls on 
the process of authorizing and appropriating funds. The legislature, there-
fore, cannot evade the governor's item veto by incorporating funding meas-
ures into authorization bills. Second, state appropriations bills are highly 
specific, thereby granting the governor greater opportunity to exercise the 
item veto. 
State constitutions are filled with detailed prescriptions and proscriptions 
on the authorization-appropriation process.114 Many state constitutions di-
rect that general appropriations bills shall embrace nothing but appropria-
tions.115 The effect is to prohibit the addition of substantive legislation to 
appropriations bills. A state legislature may be constitutionally prohibited 
from using an appropriations bill to create, amend, or repeal substantive leg-
islation.116 Furthermore, general appropriations bills are restricted to specific 
subject areas, while other appropriations are to be made by separate bills, 
each embracing but one subject. 
Some examples help illustrate the degree to which state constitutions gov~ 
em the authorization and appropriation process. The Alabama Constitution 
states that 
[t]he general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations 
for the ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial depart-
ments of the state, for interest on the public debt, and for the public 
111. Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 498, 505, 393 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960, 362 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1977). 
112. See 25 COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1984-85, at 244-45 (1984) 
(table indicating frequency of budget in each state; 20 states have biennial budget) [hereinafter 1984-
1985 BOOK OF STATES]. 
113. See 1986-1987 BooK OF STATES, supra note 97, at 83-86, 220-22 (tables indicating fre-
quency of legislative sessions and budget). 
114. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
115. E.g., ARIZ. CaNST. art. IV, § 20; CoLO. CONST. art. V, § 32; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 69; 
N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 16. 
116. See Anderson v. Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 443, 579 P.2d 620, 624 (1978) (interpreting CoLO. 
CONST. art. V, § 32 to prohibit substantive legislation in a general appropriation bill). 
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schools. . . . All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each 
embracing but one subject. 117 
181 
The Louisiana Constitution requires that "[t]he general appropriation bill 
shall be itemized and shall contain only appropriations for the ordinary oper-
ating expenses of government, public charities, pensions, and the public debt 
or interest thereon."118 The Mississippi Constitution provides that 
"[l]egislation shall not be engrafted on the appropriation bills, but the same 
may prescribe the conditions on which the money may be drawn, and for 
what purposes paid."l19 
State constitutions even prescribe the format and style of bills. The Ala-
bama Constitution provides that public laws 
shall be divided into sections for convenience, according to substance, and 
the sections designated merely by figures. Each law shall contain but one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appro-
priation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or 
revision of statutes; and no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions 
thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much 
thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred, shall be re-enacted 
and published at length. 12o 
This type of specification, commonplace in state constitutions, serves two 
purposes: it restricts the legislature and it protects the governor's item veto 
power. By contrast, the federal Constitution does not direct the style and 
form of appropriations bills nor does it distinguish between authorizations 
and appropriations. 
The governors' item veto authority is also enhanced because state appro-
priations bills are structured with a high degree of specificity. Individual 
projects are frequently itemized as a result of constitutional directives, legis-
lative practice, and judicial review. Because such details are placed in appro-
priations bills, governors are given free rein to exercise their item veto power. 
For those accustomed to lump sum funding in federal statutes, the detail 
found in state appropriations bills is extraordinary. In the California appro-
priations bill considered in 1984, the account for parks and recreation in-
cluded a number of items under $100,000.121 Mississippi appropriations bills 
have included such minutiae as $2,969 for an "Alcohol Essay." New York's 
appropriations for fiscal1985 set aside energy funds for a number of $50,000 
117. ALA. CONST. art. IV,§ 71. 
118. LA. CONST. art. III, § 16. 
119. MISS. CaNST. art. IV, § 69. 
120. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 45. 
121. Copy of California appropriations bill on file at Georgetown Law Journal. Included in the 
bill were allocations of $81,000 for a climate control study at Hearst San Simeon, $75,000 for a 
sediment runoff study at Malakoff Diggins, and $12,000 for an erosion control study at Woodson 
Bridge. 
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projects.122 
Finally, through the impoundment of funds and so-called bill recall proce-
dures, the governor can avoid a direct conflict with the legislature through 
use of the item veto. Impoundment refers to the executive's decision not to 
spend appropriated funds. Under this authority, a governor may unilaterally 
withhold funds to balance the state budget. The Missouri Constitution was 
rewritten in 1945 to give the governor explicit authority to withhold funds to 
maintain a balanced budget.I23 
Bill recall procedures, adopted in at least thirty-three states, permit the 
legislature to recall a bill from the governor before final gubernatorial ac-
tion.124 This procedure "creates a negotiating situation in which, under the 
threat of a full veto, the legislature may recall a bill and make changes in it 
desired by the governor, thus allowing him to exercise de facto amendatory 
power."125 
The bill recall procedure has effects similar to those of an item veto. Be-
tween 1932 and 1973, a total of 1,401 bills were recalled by the New York 
legislature; 618 of those bills were subsequently resubmitted to the governor 
for his signature.126 Of the returned measures, the legislature amended 451 to 
meet the governor's objections.127 Massachusetts, a state which has an item 
veto, an item reduction veto, and an amendatory veto, experienced a sharp 
drop in the use of veto power between 1949 and 1960. The reason, according 
to one study, was the availability of the bill recall procedure. 128 Most con-
flicts were resolved informally through contacts between legislators and the 
governor's office.129 
C. THE ITEM VETO AND THE STATES: AN ASSESSMENT 
State experience with the item veto has been unquestionably mixed. 
Although some evidence supports the notion that the item veto can be a 
122. Copy of New York and Mississippi appropriations bills on file at Georgetown Law Journal. 
123. The Constitution provides: 
The governor may control the rate at which any appropriation is expended during the 
period of the appropriation by allotment or other means, and may reduce the expenditures 
of the state or any of its agencies below their appropriations whenever the actual revenues 
are less than the revenue estimates upon which the appropriations were based. 
Mo. CoNST. art IV, § 27. 
124. Benjamin, The Diffusion of the Governor's Veto Power, 55 STATE Gov'T 99, 104 (1982). 
125. /d.; see 2 F. PRESCOIT & J. ZIMMERMAN, THE PoLmcs OF THE VETO LEGISLATION IN 
NEw YORK STATE 1206 (1980) (governor often suggests recall as substitute for veto to amend or 
remove objectionable provision); cf. R. Moe, supra note 98, at 21 ("bill recall procedure plays a 
major part in the legislative process of many states"). 
126. 2 F. PRESCOIT & J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 125, at 1206. 
127. Id. None of these actions was recorded as a veto. /d. 
128. Zimmerman, The Executive Veto in Massachusetts, 1947-1960, 31 Soc. Set. 162, 167 (1962). 
129. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 75 Geo. L. J. 183 1986-1987
1986] ITEM VETO 183 
significant deficit reduction measure, several studies call into question the 
item veto's effectiveness for reducing expenditures.130 Moreover, available 
evidence suggests that the item veto often functions as a partisan political 
tool and causes strife between the executive and legislative branches in state 
government.131 
The item veto has a reputation for saving money. A recent legislative anal-
ysis prepared by the American Enterprise Institute concluded that "gover-
nors have vetoed or reduced appropriations to achieve substantial 
savings."132 Specifically, this study pointed to Governor Thompson of Illi-
nois who vetoed $174.7 million and used his item reduction powers to cut 
appropriations by an additional $26 million (about three percent of the ap-
propriations), Governor Deukmejian of California who achieved savings of 
$1.2 billion (more than four percent of the state budget), and Governor 
Thornburgh of Pennsylvania who used the item veto to reduce spending by 
$1.15 billion (twelve percent of the budget).t33 
Opponents of the item veto, however, cite contrary examples and question 
the methodology utilized by proponents. Professor Aaron Wildavsky, for 
example, argues: 
The item veto does not qualify as an effective instrument of spending con-
trol because it locks the doors of the treasury after the spending bids have 
already been proposed. The trick is to prevent the presentation of excessive 
expenditure demands, not to engage in the futile task of rejecting a small 
proportion after they have been made. 134 
This claim has force. Gubernatorial reductions 'may merely cancel spend-
ing that the legislature added because the governor possessed item veto au-
thority. A study in Pennsylvania suggested, "When a legislator, even though 
opposed in principle to an appropriation, is reasonably certain that the gover-
nor will slice it down to more moderate size, he is tempted to bolster himself 
politically by voting large sums of money to a popular cause."135 Another 
130. See Abney & Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An Instrument for Fiscal Restraint or 
an Instrument for Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 372, 374 (1985) (legislatures whose appro-
priations are subject to item veto are not more "fiscally irresponsible"); Gosling, Wisconsin Item-
Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 298 (1986) (Presidential "item veto will likely result in 
budget reductions" though size of reduction may not be great). 
131. See Abney & Lauth, supra note 130, at 375 (use of item veto influenced by political partisan-
ship); Gosling, supra note 130, at 298 (Wisconsin experience suggests that President may use item 
veto to control Congress dominated by opposing political party). 
132. AMERICAN ENTER. lNST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, PROPOSALS FOR LINE-ITEM VETO 
AUTHORITY 17 (1984) [hereinafter AEI ANALYSIS]. 
133. Id. at 17-18; see Dixon, The Case for the Line Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
Pus. PoL'Y 207, 213 (1985) (citing poll of governors reporting savings through use of item veto). 
134. Wildavsky, Item Veto Without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the Treasury Door After 
the Dollars Have Fled, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 165, 173 (1985). 
135. McGeary, The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 941, 943 (1947). 
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author claimed that the item veto at the state level "encouraged legislators to 
please their constituents by voting for appropriations far in excess of antici-
pated revenues thus forcing the governor to make the inevitable reductions 
and incur the wrath of the interests adversely affected."136 In other words, 
the availability of an item veto allows legislators to shift more of the responsi-
bility for the fiscal process to the executive. 
During hearings in 1984, Senator Mark 0. Hatfield, who was governor of 
Oregon from 1958-1966, noted: 
We also know that the legislators in States which have the line-item veto 
routinely "pad" their budgets, and that was my experience, with projects 
which they expect, or even want their Governors to veto. It is a wonderful 
way for a Democrat-controlled legislature, that I had, to put a Republican 
Governor on the spot: Let him be the one to line-item these issues that 
were either politically popular, or very emotionai. 137 
The effectiveness of the item veto as a fiscal management tool sparks vigor-
ous debate. A recent survey of legislative budget officers in forty-five states 
concluded that the item veto is used more to accomplish political aims than 
to reduce the budget.138 Studies of the item veto in selected states support 
this conclusion. A review of Illinois Governor Thompson's use of the item 
veto concluded that the veto triggered numerous political battles.139 A re-
view by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Budget regard-
ing line-item veto procedures in California and Pennsylvania similarly noted 
that "[t]he power of line-item veto in the States has given rise to significant 
political strife which has, at times, threatened the shutdown of Government 
services and withholding of payments."t40 
The possibility of conflicts between the executive and legislature over item 
veto politics is heightened by various developments. Over the past fifteen 
years, state legislatures have taken a more active role in budgetary matters. 
Legislators are more willing to challenge the governor both in the develop-
136. A. MACDONALD, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 210 (1940). 
137. Line-Item Veto: Hearings on S.J. Res. 26, S.J. Res. 178, and S. 1921 Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984). Another exam-
ple of item veto politics recently occurred in Maryland. Maryland grants its governor an advance 
item veto, prohibiting the legislature from increasing any amount in the governor's budget. Mo. 
CaNST. art. Ill, §51. In practice, however, the governor, in exchange for getting the funds he 
requested, submits a supplemental bill containing items supported by the legislature. See Line 1tem 
Veto Hearings, supra note 7, at 88-89 (when Maryland legislature proposed across-the-board reduc-
tions, governor threatened to withhold supplemental appropriations) (statement of Allen Schick). 
138. Abney & Lauth, supra note 130, at 375-77. 
139. See Sevener, supra note 35, at 14 (discussing controversy over Gov. Thompson's use of item 
veto). 
140. STAff OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE LINE· ITEM VETO: 
AN APPRAISAL 11 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter APPRAISAL OF LINE-ITEM VETO). 
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ment of the budget and in seeking to overturn gubernatorial vetoes. 141 
Nor is the item veto's usefulness as a fiscal management tool proven by its 
universal implementation by governors; indeed, a governor may use the item 
veto infrequently, for numerous reasons. He might simply approve of the 
legislative budget, prefer to use some other power, iron out his differences 
with the legislature prior to his review of the budget, or be prohibited from 
using the veto as a consequence of legislative drafting or court interpretation. 
For similar reasons, frequent use of the item veto does not necessarily mean 
effective use of that power. 
V. THE FEDERAL ITEM VETO: LESSONS FROM THE STATES 
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE STATES' MODEL 
Proponents of the item veto often point to the states to demonstrate that 
the President, armed with the item veto, could better control deficits. Many 
of the over 200 such resolutions that the Congress has considered since 1876 
were based on the allegedly positive experiences states have had with the 
item veto. 142 
The states' model fails for several reasons, however. State governments 
are too different from the federal government to serve as useful models for a 
presidential item veto. Furthermore, the contours of item veto authority and 
practice vary so much from state to state that the states collectively appear 
much more like a kaleidoscope than a fixed point of reference. 
Unlike state constitutions, which have a strong antilegislative bias, a bal-
anced budget requirement, and specific controls on the process of authorizing 
and appropriating funds, 143 the federal Constititution contains few limita-
tions on the spending power and is silent on the procedures to be adopted by 
Congress to authorize and appropriate funds. There are very few limitations 
on use of the spending power: Congress may not increase or decrease the 
compensation of a President during his term in office, 144 nor may it diminish 
the compensation of members of the federal judiciary145 or use its funding 
141. See Kurtz, The State Legislatures, in 20 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES 1974-75, at 62 (1975) (one way in which legislatures have asserted independence is to de-
velop ability to analyze and review state budget); Pound, The State Legislatures, in 1984-1985 BooK 
OF STATES, supra note 112, at 82 (legislatures taking more active role in developing budgets, over-
seeing expenditures, and estimating revenues). 
142. See 131 CONG. REC. H1845 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985) (statement of Rep. Gallo); 131 CONG. 
REC. E454, E455 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (statement of Rep. Gekas); 131 CONG. REC. S425 (daily 
ed. Jan. 21, 1985) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). Congress' assumption, however, may be un-
founded. See R. Moe, supra note 98, at 1-2 (little evidence exists to show successful use of item veto 
by states). 
143. See supra notes 97-129 and accompanying text. 
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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power to establish a religion. 146 For the most part, however, the spending 
power can be used broadly to achieve social, military, and economic goals. 
Similarly, the authorization and appropriations process is without specific 
constraint. The federal Constitution is silent on the procedures to be adopted 
by Congress to authorize and appropriate funds. Appropriations and author-
ization bills are governed solely by House and Senate rules as a part of the 
internal procedures of Congress.147 It was not until after the Civil War that 
Congress established appropriations committees. 148 Prior to that time, the 
House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee han-
dled both appropriations bills and revenue measures. 149 Congress may today 
appropriate by tax committees, legislative committees, and appropriations 
committees. If Congress chose to do so, it could place substantive legislation 
in appropriations bills and allow authorization committees to fund programs 
directly through the use of "backdoor spending." These matters are left ex-
clusively to House and Senate rules and to Congress' interpretation and exe-
cution of its rules. 150 Unlike states that include specifications for the style 
and format of appropriations bills, Congress may decide to appropriate only 
in large, lump sum amounts, eliminating from the bill specific projects and 
activities that the President hoped to veto. In fact, Congress and the execu-
tive agencies both prefer lump sum funding to accommodate the need for 
administrative discretion. 151 To protect its interests, Congress relies to a 
large extent on nonstatutory controls, specifying the allocation of lump sum 
amounts in such places as committee reports. 152 Unless Congress substan-
tially alters the structure of appropriations bills, the item veto would give the 
President little additional control over individual projects, programs, or ac-
tivities. Nevertheless, item veto proponents like President Reagan continue 
to insist that the item veto would permit him to "carve out the boondoggles 
and pork that would never survive on their own."153 
Other differences between the state and federal systems weaken the case 
for a presidential item veto. Governors were granted item vetoes because 
state legislatures sat for only brief periods of the year, sometimes meeting 
only every other year. 154 This part time status required the governor to as-
sume major budget responsibilities and to exercise substantial authority dele-
146. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968). 
147. Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal 
Practices, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 51, 53-54 (1979) (Constitution merely demands that appropriations 
be made by law; authorization-appropriation system is means for fulfilling this requirement). 
148. /d. at 57. 
149. /d. at 54. 
150. /d. at 104-05. 
151. L. FISHER, supra note 11, at 59-98. 
152. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
153. President's State of the Union Address, reprinted in Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1987, at AS, col. 3. 
154. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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gated to him. Item vetoes were also a means of complying with balanced 
budget requirements in state constitutions. 155 Neither condition applies to 
the federal government. Moreover, governors employ their item vetoes over 
jurisdictions smaller and more cohesive than that faced by the President. 
Governors have a familiarity with local needs that cannot be expected of 
Presidents and their assistants. Senator Russell Long questioned whether it 
is true that "when a Governor vetoes a line item involving even a single 
county within his State, he is usually familiar with what it is that he is veto-
ing, but that in many instances a President would be called upon and asked 
by his bureaucracy to veto something where he has never been there, never 
seen it, and has no direct familiarity with it at al1?" 156 In 1983, Senator Law-
ton Chiles pointed to the contrast between governors and the President: "I 
think we can say the States tend to have much stronger executives, much 
stronger Governors. In fact, I think that was one of the problems when a 
Governor of Georgia came up here, and became President of the United 
States. He did not have any idea what he was running into with Congress 
because he had been dealing only with the Georgia legislature. . . . [J]ust 
because something works in the States is no reason for us to adopt it." 157 
The structural differences between state and federal budgetary processes, 
however, do not comprise the major issue. Instead, it concerns the balance of 
power between the executive and legislative branches. The history of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921158 is illustrative. The ingredients of a 
strong executive budget were included in many of the reform proposals that 
led to the Act, which placed upon the President the responsibility for submit-
ting a comprehensive budget plan to Congress. As a way of constraining 
legislative action, reformers urged that Congress be prohibited from appro-
priating money unless requested by the head of a department or approved by 
a two-thirds vote in both Houses. 159 All such proposals were rejected by 
Congress.160 The Budget and Accounting Act calls for an "executive 
budget" only in the sense that the President is responsible for the estimates 
he submits.161 It is a "legislative budget" thereafter. Members of Congress 
may alter the President's budget as they please, up or down, by simple major-
ity vote. The status of the President's budget as simply a set of recommenda-
tions was clearly established by the legislative history: 
155. See supra note 109-11 and accompanying text. 
156. 129 CONG. REc. Sl4,941 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1983); see Review of the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1981) (remarks by Sen. Stevens echoing Sen. Long's skepticism). 
157. 129 CONG. REC. Sl4,940 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1983). 
158. Pub. L. No. 13, ch. 18, 48 Stat. 20 (1921). 
159. L. FtsHER, supra note 16, at 232-33. 
160. Id. at 233-34. 
161. Id. at 234. 
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It will doubtless be claimed by some that this is an Executive budget and 
that the duty of making appropriations is a legislative rather than Execu-
tive prerogative. The plan outlined does provide for an Executive initiation 
of the budget, but the President's responsibility ends when he has prepared 
the budget and transmitted it to Congress. To that extent, and to that 
extent alone, does the plan provide for an Executive budget, but the pro-
posed law does not change in the slightest degree the duty of Congress to 
make the minutest examination of the budget and to adopt the budget only 
to the extent that it is found to be economical. If the estimates contained in 
the President's budget are too large, it will be the duty of Congress to re-
duce them. If in the opinion of Congress the estimates of expenditure are 
not sufficient, it will be within the power of Congress to increase them. The 
bill does not in the slightest degree give the Executive any greater power 
than he now has over the consider~tion of appropriations by Congress. 162 
If these differences are not enough, a close look at the states' experience 
with the item veto reveals that it is very difficult to generalize from their 
record. State practices range from the deletion of a single budgetary item in 
an appropriation bill to the alteration of both appropriations and authorizing 
legislation.163 Similar differences exist among bill recall, impoundment, and 
other alternative devices to the item veto. 164 The ability of the legislature to 
undercut this authority through lump sum appropriations and other tactics 
also differs from state to state. 165 Finally, the predilections of the governors, 
the size of the state budgets, and the nature of the state balanced budget 
amendments all vary. 
These differences notwithstanding, a review of the mechanisms and exper-
iences of the states does provide useful insights for assessing a federal item 
veto proposal. Although the federal experience will not mirror that of any 
state, state experiences do reveal the sorts of issues that might arise if item 
veto authority is granted to the President. 
B. APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE STATES 
The states' experience may prove instructive in evaluating an item veto for 
the President in three regards: Is the item veto a deficit reduction measure or 
a partisan political tool? How will the item veto affect the balance of power 
between the President and Congress? What role will the courts play in defin-
ing the scope of the item veto power? 
162. H.R. REP. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1921). 
163. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing variations of the simple item veto). 
164. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text (discussing fund impoundment and bill 
recall). 
165. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text (scope of item veto and definition of "appro-
priation" vary). 
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1. Deficit Reduction or Partisan Tool? 
It appears unlikely that the item veto would allow the President to signifi-
cantly reduce deficits. Under the current federal system and the political 
priorities of the Reagan Administration, the item veto would apply to less 
than fifteen percent of the budget-the domestic discretionary programs 
funded in annual appropriations bills. 166 The rest of the budget consists of 
interest on the federal debt, defense spending, and entitlement programs that 
are funded automatically through permanent appropriations or annually 
through the regular appropriations bills. 167 Whether funded automatically 
or annually, entitlements are controlled by changing substantive law (eligibil-
ity, level of benefits) rather than through the appropriation process. 
Through its power to control the structure of appropriations bills, Congress 
could easily neutralize the theoretical advantage of the item veto. State legis-
latures have become adroit at combining within a single item a program the 
governor dislikes with one that he supports. If Congress continued to appro-
priate in lump sum amounts, there would be no "items" for the President to 
veto. Programs could be funded indirectly through the tax laws, federal 
credit, or permanent appropriations or placed "off budget." 
In 1970, the appropriations committees had responsibility for two-thirds of 
federal outlays; all other committees shared responsibility for the remaining 
third. The responsibility is now almost evenly divided. If entitlements sub-
ject to annual appropriations are included-an exercise purely ministerial 
and mechanical on the part of the appropriations committees-:-the other 
committees are now responsible for more than half of budget outlays. The 
bulk of this consists of Social Security, Medicare, and interest on the public 
debt, all of which are within the jurisdiction of the tax committees.168 
One of the remarkable qualities of the proposal to grant the President an 
item veto is that proponents constantly ignore the fact that appropriations 
bills passed by Congress do not contain items. Specific projects are not 
166. See Line Item Veto Hearings, supra note 7, at 51 (statement of Sen. Hatfield). In making 
this assertion, Sen. Hatfield assumed that the Reagan Administration would not use the item veto to 
reduce defense expenditures. Id. In response to this claim, item veto proponents note that the 
prospects of "small [deficit] reductions amount to something that cannot be concluded to be insig-
nificant." !d. at 70 (statement of Sen. Evans). 
167. See AEI ANALYSIS, supra note 132, at 16-17 (opponents argue item veto would apply to 
only nondefense discretionary spending; proponents argue item veto could have important impact 
on spending); Dixon, supra note 133, at 214 (item veto would apply to only part of nondefense 
discretionary spending); APPRAISAL OF LINE-ITEM VETO, supra note 140, at 3-4 (current proposals 
for line-item veto would limit its use to those matters subject to nondefense discretionary annual 
appropriations). 
168. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RULES, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., ISSUE PRESENTA-
TIONS BEFORE THE RULES COMM. TASK FORCE ON THE BUDGET PROCESS 25-26 (Comm. Print 
1984) (Statement of James L. Blum, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis in the Congressional 
Budget Office). 
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placed in appropriations bills passed by Congress. Both branches, legislative 
and executive, prefer lump sum funding to accommodate the need for admin-
istrative adjustments as the fiscal year unfolds. Details are found only in 
nonstatutory sources. 
For example, the Energy and Water Development Appropriation for fiscal 
1985 included $864,500,000 for the General Construction account for the 
Corps ofEngineers.169 The individual projects are not mentioned in the pub-
lic law; instead, such details are placed in the committee reports and agency 
budget justification documents. 170 Unless Congress substantially alters the 
structure of appropriations bills by following the state model, the item veto 
would give the President little additional control over individual projects, 
programs, and activities. He would have to strike the entire lump sum. 
If Congress were to decide to pattern itself after the states by resorting to 
line itemization, the consequences may be undesirable. Agency officials want 
the latitude and flexibility associated with lump sum funding. Members of 
Congress do not want details fixed into public law either, for the only way to 
adjust statutory details to unexpected developments is to pass another public 
law. Neither the executive nor the legislature wants that rigidity. 
The history of item vetoes at the state level reveals that legislatures are 
willing to appropriate excessive funds to please their constituents and place 
the onus of deficit reduction on the governor171 and that governors often use 
the item veto as a threat to encourage reluctant legislators to approve the 
governor's proposals in exchange for the governor's agreement to preserve 
their projects.172 
An item veto might make Congress more irresponsible. To satisfy constit-
uent demands, even those of the most indefensible nature, a member need 
only add extraneous material to a bill with the understanding among his 
colleagues that the President will probably strike the offending amendment. 
The adoption of an item veto could make the problem of logrolling worse by 
triggering a new round of budgetary legerdemain and political 
unaccountability. 
If Congress were to restructure appropriations bills to provide for line-
itemization, Presidents, White House aides, and agency officials would have 
an additional weapon to influence members of Congress. As Senator Mark 
Hatfield remarked in 1984: 
The line item veto has wide ranging ramifications on the gamut of decisions 
made by the Congress. We have all witnessed the power of the President 
169. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-360, 98 Stat. 
403 (1984). 
170. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 866, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-22 (1984). 
171. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. 
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when he lobbies Congress by telephone. It does not take much imagination 
to consider how much more persuasive he would be if his words were but-
tressed with a veto stamp over individual projects and activities within our 
States or districts. 173 
191 
Whether this tactic would restrain or encourage spending is purely specu-
lative. It is easy to imagine scenarios with either result. The threat of an 
item veto could force legislators to scale back the size of a program, but that 
can be done now with the regular veto. On the other hand, White House 
lobbyists could advise a member of Congress that certain projects in his or 
her district or state are being considered for an item veto. At the same time, 
the member could be asked how he or she plans to vote on the administra-
tion's bill schedule~ for consideration the following week. Perhaps a minor 
project would survive in return for the legislator's willingness to support a 
costly administration program. Both sides would prevail in this accommoda-
tion, pushing budget totals upward. A particular project could also be held 
hostage in return for a member's support for a nominee or some other presi-
dential objective. 
Presidential item vetoes might also prove devastating to sparsely populated 
states. Despite their equal representation in the Senate, states with few 
House members would be hard pressed to gain support to override a presi-
dential veto. The thirteen states with either one or two members in the 
House of Representatives would have little chance of achieving an override 
of a vetoed item. 174 As one study earlier this century noted: "To expect two-
thirds of the Members of each House of Congress to take up their cudgels 
and fight for an appropriation of interest to only one small locality is to ig-
nore facts in the great game of politics."l7S 
2. The Balance of Power 
The item veto would undoubtedly alter the relation between the President 
and Congress. State experiences with the item veto indicate that this guber-
natorial power may well serve as leverage for the governor to advance his 
political agenda. For example, while governor of California, Ronald Reagan 
was adept at using the item veto for such purposes.t76 
Some proponents of the item veto claim that the change in the relationship 
between the two branches is proper; it merely restores the appropriate bal-
173. 130 CONG. REc. S5307 (daily ed. May 3, 1984). 
174. See 129 CoNG. REc. S14,942 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long). For the 
99th Congress, six states have a single member in the House of Representatives: Alaska, Delaware, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Seven states have two Representatives: 
Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. 
175. V. WILKINSON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE ITEM VETO 30 (1936). 
176. See H. Griffin, supra note 38, at 254-74 (analyzing Gov. Reagan's use, and threats of use, of 
item veto). 
HeinOnline -- 75 Geo. L. J. 192 1986-1987
192 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:159 
ance between the two branches. According to one advocate of the item veto, 
"It is fair to say that the veto power created by the Founders has been dis-
placed and debilitated, and that some form of item-veto would be viewed by 
the Founders as necessary to reinstate the veto power they originally envi-
sioned."177 On the other hand, a critic of the item veto argues that it would 
"concentrate substantial new powers in that most concentrated of power ba-
ses, the presidency."178 Representative Mickey Edwards noted that this "ac-
quiescence to the imperial presidency . . . threatens the foundation of our 
form of government-a system carefully designed to balance powers and 
limit central authority."t79 
Although the President's general veto power has been weakened to some 
extent by omnibus appropriations bills, the Founders would be surprised by 
the powers that have accrued to the contemporary President. The powers 
include vast institutional resources available in the Executive Office of the 
President and are manifested by the deep involvement of the President in the 
legislative process. Allowing the veto of a portion of a bill would increase the 
President's role in the legislative process, perhaps to the extent of undermin-
ing the original purpose of the legislature. Deletion of some sections may 
make the remainder contrary to legislative intent, both technically and sub-
stantively, and may upset the political balance reached by tradeoffs and com-
promises and embodied in the legislation as a whole. 
Second, the item veto would magnify the stature of the President's budget. 
When first initiated under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the exec-
utive budget was nothing more than a proposal to be amended as Congress 
decided. The final judgment was for Congress to make, subject to presiden-
tial veto. But the President, armed with an item veto, could strike from an 
appropriations bill the programs that Congress had added or augmented. 
Rarely would Congress muster the two-thirds majority in each House to 
override him. 
Administration officials who advocate item veto authority are very candid 
in admitting that congressional initiatives and add-ons would be vulnerable. 
For example, Budget Director Percival Brundage told the House Judiciary 
Committee in 1957 that "the authority to veto an appropriation item would 
include authority to reduce an appropriation-but only to the extent neces-
sary to permit the disapproval of amounts added by Congress for unbudgeted 
programs or projects, or of increases by Congress of amounts included in the 
177. Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, 14 PRES. STUD. Q. 183, 188 (1984); see 
Line Item Veto Hearings, supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Judith Best) (item veto will reduce 
pernicious deal making among legislators). 
178. Edwards, A Conservative's Case Against the Line Item Veto, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1984, at 
A19, col. 1. 
179. Id. 
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budget."180 The President's 1985 Economic Report explained that adoption 
of the item veto "may not have a substantial effect on total Federal expendi-
tures" but may be used by the President "to change the composition of Fed-
eral expenditures-from activities preferred by the Congress to activities 
preferred by the President."181 The item veto would improperly magnify the 
role of the President's budget in the appropriations process; his budget 
should be a starting point, not a fixed ceiling, for congressional action. 
3. Role of the Courts 
In the states, court rulings have been instrumental in establishing the scope 
of the gubernatorial item veto. Federal court rulings, undoubtedly, would 
play an equally significant role in determining the reach of the President's 
item veto authority. The federal judiciary might insist that congressional in-
tent be preserved, thus limiting the item veto to dollar amounts. On the 
other hand, courts might view the item veto as a repository of vast executive 
power and allow the President to veto conditions on appropriations and even 
reduce the level of appropriations. Finally, federal courts, like their state 
counterparts, might be unable to develop a coherent doctrinal approach to 
the item veto. Irrespective of the course ultimately taken by the judiciary, the 
unpredictability of this endeavor is extremely troublesome. 
The range of approaches taken by state judges illustrates the possible reach 
of judicial authority. State courts differ on several fundamental issues. Some 
courts emphasize legislative prerogatives, others stress gubernatorial author-
ity. Some courts are literalists in their interpretation of this power, others 
consider the context in which the governor exercises item veto power. State 
courts also differ in their understanding of whether the exercise of item veto 
authority is a positive or negative act. Furthermore, these courts are often 
unable to understand the complexities of the budgetary process. Questions 
concerning spending that occurs outside the appropriations process, for ex-
ample, have frustrated several state courts.182 
Because the courts of different states have adopted different perspectives, 
identical item veto provisions have received quite different interpretations. If 
the President is granted item veto authority, the federal judiciary will be em-
broiled in some of the same issues presented in state courts. Federal budget-
ary decisions are frequently made outside the appropriations process. 
Moreover, Congress often attaches conditions to appropriations bills. For 
example, Congress has attached riders to appropriations bills that have pro-
180. Item Veto: Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 
(1957). 
181. R. REAGAN, EcONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 96 (Feb. 1985). 
182. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text (discussing appropriations and funding 
through revenue bills). 
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hibited federal funding of abortion, 183 restricted American military activity 
during the Vietnam War, 184 and limited efforts by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to ensure that private school operations are nondiscriminatory. 185 
Because so many aspects of the federal lawmaking process are incompati-
ble with the item veto, such presidential authority would be subject to more 
extensive and more complicated litigation than the gubernatorial item veto. 
Federal appropriations bills do not currently contain specific items. Thus, the 
President may look to committee reports and other nonstatutory sources to 
delete specified projects from an appropriations measure. Additionally, be-
cause the federal Constitution does not distinguish between appropriations 
and authorizations, Congress may seek to limit a presidential item veto by 
funding projects either through the authorization process or indirectly 
through tax laws. The federal courts would inevitably be called upon to re-
solve these ambiguities by drawing discrete lines of power between the Presi-
dent and Congress. 
Courts, in resolving such issues, might allow Congress to reduce the item 
veto power to a nullity by validating lump sum appropriations or holding 
that the item veto is limited to appropriations. At the other extreme, courts 
might view a presidential item veto as a near plenary grant of authority and 
might give the President item reduction authority or extend the item veto to 
nonappropriations. Under either scenario, the delicate balance of power be-
tween the President and Congress could be easily disrupted by judicial 
action. 
The prospect of such judicial disruption is not fanciful. In INS v. 
Chadha, 186 the Court struck down the one house legislative veto through a 
formalistic reading of the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment 
clauses. The thrust of this decision was to discourage congressional over-
183. E.g., Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (Hyde Amendment for 
fiscal year 1980); Departments of Labor and HEW Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 
92 Stat. 1586 (1979) (same for fiscall979); Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat 
1460 (same for fiscal 1978); see Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 833 n.10, 836 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting 
Hyde Amendment enacted as part of appropriations bills and made substantive changes to Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1974)); Zbaraz v. Quem, 596 F.2d 196, 199-201 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(same), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 123, 134 (1st 
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979). 
184. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-171, § 643, 83 Stat. 469 (1969); 
see Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 725-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Congress had limited scope of Viet-
nam conflict through policy statements in appropriation bills), aff'd sub. nom Orlando v. Laird, 443 
F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 868 (1971). 
185. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov't Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 
93 Stat. 577 (1980); see McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemp-
tions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 460-61 (1984) (Congress 
blocked implementation of proposed IRS procedure by denying appropriations for enforcement). 
See generally Devins, supra note 37. 
186. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See supra note 7 (discussion of Chadha). 
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sight of the executive. Moreover, the Court paid short shrift to fifty years of 
delicate accommodations between the executive and legislative branches on 
this matter. 187 If judicial review of the item veto were similarly unsupportive 
of legislative interests, congressional control over the appropriations process 
would be significantly undercut. Such a result would substantially alter the 
traditional balance of power between Congress and the President on appro-
priations matters. 
Federal court interpretations of a presidential item veto might have the 
unintended result of transforming the judiciary into arbitrators of the federal 
budgetary process. In light of state court decisionmaking, differences be-
tween the state and federal budgetary process, and federal court rulings that 
have affected the balance of powers, the prospect of such fundamental deci-
sions being made in the courts is unsettling. The judiciary is the branch least 
suited to mediate the budgetary process. 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The "item veto" is not a simple concept as implemented by the states, nor 
is there any easy method of predicting how it would function at the federal 
level. The importance of the item veto cannot be measured merely through 
statistics; quantitative tests in this area are more likely to mislead than to 
illuminate. The threat of an item veto might be more politically influential 
than its actual use, yet we are in no position to measure "threats." Informal 
negotiations by the governor and his assistants can result in the deletion of 
items that will never be recorded in the books as a veto. Furthermore, 
through the bill recall procedure, most governors are able to amend legisla-
tion without the formal use of their veto authority. 
Infrequent use of item vetoes reflects the political realities of the budget 
making process. The governor and the legislature cooperatively produce a 
budget "and the governor does not welsh on agreements by vetoing 
items."tss The structure of an appropriations bill may eliminate, as a practi-
cal matter, the opportunity for an item veto. 189 Some governors have hesi-
tated to use the item veto too vigorously, fearing that this would transfer an 
excessive amount of budgetary responsibility to the executive branch and re-
lieve legislators of the need to exercise independent and continuing judgment 
187. This criticism does not speak to the Supreme Court's constitutional ruling in Chadha. See 
generally Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative Veto Case, 
45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705 (1985). 
188. D. LOCKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 394 (1963). 
189. C. RANSOME, THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IN THE SOUTH 83 (1951); see Prescott, The 
Executive Veto in American States, 3 W. POL. Q. 98, 107 (1950) (item veto rarely used in Alabama 
because legislature uses lump sum appropriations). 
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on the merit of bills. 190 
Granting the President an item veto would undoubtedly introduce a pow-
erful new dynamic to executive-legislative relations. Because of the informal 
and private communications between the branches, it would be practically 
impossible to maintain much accountability for fiscal results. Members 
would vote with new incentives, subjected to pressures and calculations that 
did not exist before. 
Every governmental system seeks techniques and methods for resolving 
conflicts. The item veto may help resolve some disputes, but it can also 
heighten conflict among the branches. The exercise of item veto power con-
tinues to generate a substantial amount of litigation. Notwithstanding de-
cades of state court decisions, no stable set of operating principles has yet to 
emerge. Indeed, the situation is more judicially unsettled than it was fifty 
years ago. Frequent and protracted cases are costly for all parties: the legis-
lature, the executive, agencies, and the private sector. 
When an executive possesses only general veto authority, the legislature is 
under both external and internal pressure to produce a budget that represents 
its best collective judgment. Whatever passes is likely to be enacted. The 
incentives of the system encourage compromise before the bill reaches the 
executive. Negotiations take place as the bill progresses from committee to 
the floor and from one chamber to the other. If the bill contains too many 
offensive passages, the executive may veto it and jeopardize delicate agree-
ments and accommodations. 
Availability of the item veto may diminish the incentives for lawmakers to 
closely control substantive provisions and the level of appropriations. This is 
especially the case if appropriations bills are recast by Congress to include 
specific projects and programs, following the custom of states. Legislators 
could insert extravagant and irresponsible items with the peace of mind that 
the executive could strike them from the bill. Colleagues in the legislative 
branch would be less likely to challenge these provisions, preferring to leave 
that task to reviewers in the executive branch. Instead of negotiating pri-
vately in good faith, important issues may be left unresolved until the bill 
reaches the executive. The result may be a series of confrontations between 
the President and members of Congress, with interest groups given one more 
opportunity to influence the outcome. 
Under this scenario, political conflicts are not resolved as much as they are 
heightened. The item veto, billed as an essential instrument for accountabil-
ity, may actually diffuse responsibility by constantly shifting the onus of ac-
tion to another governmental body: from the legislature to the executive, 
from the executive back to the legislature, and from both political branches 
190. Dorr, The Executive Veto in Michigan, 20 MICH. HIST. MAG. 91, 101-02 (1936). 
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to the courts. As these items are bounced back and forth between the 
branches like a political shuttlecock, there will be substantial delays in the 
enactment of appropriations bills and uncertainty on the part of agencies, 
state governments, and private citizens regarding their funding levels. 
Like all political reforms, the item veto has been replete with unanticipated 
consequences. Transferring the item veto from the states to the national gov-
ernment is an exceptionally complex and hazardous step, to be taken only 
after the most careful and informed deliberations. There is more at stake 
than budgetary savings. At issue are such fundamental questions as the 
scope of presidential power and the preservation of congressional 
prerogatives. 
